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articles underwent the fire of criticism at the time of its reading
and by the editor, and since each was rewritten in view of these
comments it does contain in its present form the benefits of
group thinking.
The serious reader will find in these papers much wisdom
and much to ponder upon. Everyone knows that the past can
not be taken over wholesale and made into the present—for bet
ter or worse we are persons of the latter half of the twentieth
century, not of the seventeenth and even less of the first. On
the other hand, we have arisen from the past and our founda
tions are laid in it. How, then, are we to draw from it its deep
est meanings and values and allow it to speak its message? These
questions are of great interest to us all; to them the authors have
directed their best thought.
J.C.K.
Quakerism and the Historical Interpretation
When all my hopes . in all men were gone, so that I
had nothing outwardly to help me, nor could I tell what to
do, then, oh, then, I heard a voice which said, “There is one,
even Christ Jesus, that can speak to thy condition,” and when
I heard it, my heart did leap for joy.
Then the Lord let me see why there was none upon the
earth that could speak to my condition, namely, that I might
give Him all the glory . . . Thus when God doth work,
who shall hinder it? and this I knew experimentally.1
And this I knew experimentally—that there is one, even
Christ Jesus, that can speak to thy condition. What Fox brings
together here suggests to me that he, too, contended with the
very issue that confronts us: the relation between the historical
and the spiritual elements of faith. Faith for him is certainly
not a simple matter of an objective knowledge of fact and yet
it is clearly faith in the God who speaks to man, who reveals
himself in history, in Jesus Christ; it is not faith in man’s own
capacity for an historically unmecliated relation with God. The
bifurcation in American Quakerism (at its worst) marks a tear
ing asunder of what is here so naturally brought together—the
Christ of history and the Light within—a disruption leading to
an external objectivity or a self-confident subjectivity. Each
makes faith too easy and too weak to grapple seriously with life
as it confronts us in our so-called post-modern world.
QUAKERISM AND ITS RELATION TO ITS OWN HISTORY
Nor can we simply return to Fox’s answer, though we do
need to return to an understanding of it. We cannot put it as
he did; for, though (as Rudolf Bultmann points out) our rela
tion to revelation is always the same, our way of talking and
thinking about it does change. What we look at may be the
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• same, but the historical standpoint from which we look is inev
itably a changing one.
Our probleiii, the question of the relation of history to the
present moment, is not exclusively a Quaker one, for outside
Quakerism there are attempts to wrestle with it which we as
Quakers should take into account, as I shall try to do in this
paper. It is not a problem imposed on Quakerism from the
outside but one that we live with and face, within Quakerism
and within ourselves. 1 could not write of it—conscious as I am
of my lack of knowledge of Quaker history and of my inability
to provide a finally satisfying answer (much less (lie Quaker
answer) , and, more importantly, of a more basic kind of failing
to live where the answer is to be found—were it not that I know
the qcestion, have lived with it, have had to stand with different
answers, have had to learn again and again that the relation is
not a logical one, that (as Cardinal Newman said) it is not to
he solved by a smart syllogism. I am grateful to Quakerism
because, even when it rises above its potherb nun its dishwater
temmcLncies, it still recognizes that there are no shortcuts, that
each must find his own way.
So I do not know whether I write more as a spokesman for
Quakerism or as a witness to it of what I think it neglects or
ignores (to its own peril or only to my dissatisfaction?) not only
in its own history but in a larger historical context as well. For
I believe in the relevance of this larger context, believe that
what we as Quakers have to say now and what we had to say in
the past is part of a dialogue with the witness of other elements
in the Christian church and also, but somehow secondly, with
those outside that church. If to be an American means to think
of the Pilgrim Fathers as our fathers, then to be a Quaker would
mean to think of Fox and Penington arid Penn and Woolman
and a host of others as our fathers; including, I would submit,
Rufus Jones. For we cannot understand who we are unless we
understand ourselves in relation to all of our past, unless we
realize how much the way we put things today is colored by
our reaction to Rufus Jones and to his generation. I think also
that Richard Niebuhr is correct in suggesting that if we limit
our apnropriation to our Quaker forefathers we remain in a
sectarian frame of mind. I believe most of us would admit to
having ancestors (and brothers) in the faith elsewhere as well,
though we might not all find them in the same place.
An historical understanding of our own faith must mean
that what Quakerism is called to be can be found only in rela
tion to the past but not determined by it; that, in fact, the mean
ing of our past will itself be determined by our hope and vision
for the future. Martin 1-Teidegger’s claim that the past is made
by the future sounds strange and paradoxical. It is not wholly
true; it seems to reflect some of the old liberal faith in man as
his own maker, in history as the realm of freedom and not of
necessity as well, but nevertheless it is suggestive. I wonder, is
it reassuring to think that the ultimate meaning of early Quak
erism depends partly on us?
SPiRITUAL AND HISTORICAL CONCEPTIONS OF RELIGION
The question of the relation of the historical and spiritual
conceptions of religion might appear to be only a question of
language, a legitimately individual choice of the symbols which
seem most consonant with our experience, but we evade the issue
if we discuss it at this level alone. The symbols are various—the
Inner Light, Jesus Christ, the Self, the Cross, Now, the Word,
the Eschatological Event—and they are not all simply equivalents
for they imply very different understandings of our religion. The
decision about language turns out to be a choice of an ultimate
standpoint, a decision about the nature of the relationship be
tween God and man and thus about the nature of man and of
God. There is also a question whether God has really set all
these symbols before us and said, pick the one that seems most
appropriate to you.
The consummate mystical or spiritual experience is one of
a loss of self, of a union with God; religious experience is felt
to be private and ineffable. Although many words are used in
trying to express the inexpressible, in the end all that seems to
be possible for the mystic is to point or to exclaim or to resort
to the neti, neti of negative theology. A rationalist metaphysic,
by contrast, is not even in principle so silent: it seeks to describe
God as he is in himself. Yet here, too, there is the presumption
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of a kind of union with God—not through ecstasy but through
thought coming to share his standpoint. In both cases, mystical
as well as rationalistic, man attempts to abstract himself, to re
move himself, from history.
The historical conception, on the other hand, recognizes
that theology can only be done from the human standpoint, riot
from God’s, for man is man and God is God. It insists that the
only important knowledge of God for man is knowledge of his
relation to us, his will in regard to us. We can know this will
because God meets us in our own realm, in history. This is the
conception we find in the Bible and it is one characteristic
of biblical faith. History is not illusory because God does not
create illusions. Man is not essentially a spirit or a rational
mind oniy accidentally endowed with a time- and space-bound
body; he is essentially historical, a unit3’ of body and soul who
becomes fully a person only in relationship with others. He
fmds himself “in a world with others”; this situation belongs to
the God-man relation as the context of man’s responsibility.
Christianity, Newman says, tells us what God is by telling us
what he has done—by the recital, as the current phrase has it, of
God’s mighty acts in history. This means not only the recital
of the Gospel history but of what God has done and is doing for
me, for I am involved in God’s history, I am addressed by his
word. Thus the confessions of an Augustine; thus also the jour
nal of George Fox written that all might know the dealings of
the Lord with him.
As we examine these various approaches, we are aware that
the Quaker emphasis on a spiritual religion never meant mysti
cism in its extreme sense. The early Friends saw the relation to
God in terms of communion, of obedience, not of mystical or
metaphysical union; in terms of will, not of an almost bodiless
spirit. Although Fox saw clearly that faith could not mean
simply dogmatic adherence to a proposition about an event that
had happened once in a long ago past, his own “break-through”
experience implied precisely a new and living relation to the
historical revelation, a realization that the one who spoke then
speaks now, and that we know God only as we know ourselves
to be known by him. No more than for Luther was religion
for Fox something that happened “in a corner.” It did not mean
only the self alone before God (though it did mean that), but
also the gathering of a community. If revelation meets us in
history it meets us in the realm of encounter and response, of
man with man, the realm of our responsibility for each other.
God wishes to bring us to him not only as individuals but in that
togetherness with one another which was intended for us by the
very order of our creation. This recognition that faith implies
community is an intrinsic element of the historical conception
of faith. The community has a covenantal relationship with
God, it witnesses for him, serves as a paradigm for his kingdom,
and (as Luther stressed) is needed by us all at times.
What we mean by speaking of the Quaker emphasis on spir
itual religion is, rather than rnysticisni, faith as trust in another,
as a personal relation involving the whole man, not only his
mind or spirit. To hold together such a conception of faith and
an historical conception of revelation is always difficult but when
they fall apart it is more than tension that is lost. Faith then
becomes not a relation to a person but a relation to the fact
of something’s once having happened, or else it becomes a per
sonal relation with God for which the historical revelation in
Christ is at most a paradigm. It becomes an intellectual con
‘iCtiOfl or a Pietistic feeling, faith in spirit, in man’s spirit, or
faith in faith. Yet faith in history itself—the conviction that
God’s self-revelation can be identified with the progression of
world-historical events—is just as iminanentistic as faith in spirit,
just as characteristic of nineteenth-century liberalism and just as
impossible for us. I doubt that even the most optimistic of Quak
ers could today simply identify God’s way through the world
with the outward unfolding of history. Martin Buber’s convic
tion that holy history is hidden history seems hardly questionable.
The difficulty is that both history arid spirit arc ambiguous
terms, that belief irs either has proven illusory and that we do
not know how to bring them back together again. By focussing
on either alone, we lose the paradox—the difference between man
and God and the mystery of the meeting between them.
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THE MEANINGLESSNESS OF HiSTORY
These questions about history face us with special poignancy
today because the questions concerning the end or goal of his
tory, of meaninglessness in history, and of there being no discern
ible realm of meaning beyond history, meet us in our news
papers day by day. The options .ceern to I)e either a realm of
meaning completely dissociated from history (or particularly
from public history, as witness the ‘‘retreat to the home’’ of my
generation) or chaos. It is not boredom or futility by which we
feel threatened, but catastrophe. T. S. Eliot’s lines:
This is the way the world ends
This is the way the world ends
This is the way the world ends
Not with a bang but a whimper
now seem ironically premature.
Our situation now, the situation as felt from within as well as
in its external aspect, has changed tremendously during the past
decades—a different emphasis seenis called for, an emphasis which
I should think we as Quakers ought to feel called to make al
though I am not sure that we are really awake to the readiness in
this hour for what we might say. Yet that the situation is different
now, that a different emphasis is called for, is perceived by the
very ones who helped to shape that earlier way of looking. Karl
Barth who spoke then of the deity of God, of his infinite quali
tative distance from man, speaks now of the humanity of God,
the God who wills to be the God of man, the God who shows
who and what lie is in his togetherness with man, in the con
text of his history and dialogue with man. Karl Jaspers, who
emphasized then the significance of the trans-rational elements
in man’s existence, speaks now of the necessity for siding with
reason in the midst of the fog of the irrational. Then it was too
easy a faith in man, in his rationality, that was deplored—-now
it is too ready a despair. Then the protest was against an auto
matic equating of history and progress, against extravagant esti
mates of man’s freedom and self-sufficiency; now the plea is
that nevertheless man should not despair and may not, cannot,
retreat from history. If even Barth is not afraid to speak of
universalism today, do not we with our testimony to a light that
enlighteneth every man have something to say, something that
can be said without denying our historical Christian witness?
When we reject that witness, those of us who do, is it more be
cause of our concern for those who have never heard the Gospel,
or because we cannot accept our own need of a savior?
It seems to be true that we are of the “post-Nein” genera
tion, that since Barth’s “No” at Barmen we cannot simply identi
fy God and history. We all seem to share Karl Löwith’s conclu
sion to his book, Meaning in Histrny, that there is no immanent
meaning to history. The question then is, how is a transcendent
meaning related to history? The Christian response is that the
transcendent meaning does not negate history but transfigures it;
that history is overcome by—history! that God comes into history.
FAITH AND THE PERCEPTION OF HISTORICAL MEANING
At first glance, to identify God’s revelation of himself with
a particular historical event or series of events in the past would
seem to deny that God is a living God who meets me here and
now. But this, according to the modern philosophy of history
as represented by a Dilthey, a Collingwood, or a Heidegger, is
to misconstrue our relation to historical events. To ask a funda
mentally historical question of revelation would be, precisely,
to ask its meaning for us, its relevance to our present situation,
to understand it as part of our own personal history, as qualify
ing our own present existence. An historical past is not simply
a time that once was and will never be again; it is rather a
moment whose meaning and significance continue to exist as a
dimension of the present. The historical dimensions of past and
future are inside us as well as out, as aspects of each historical
moment. It is only as we recognize this, recognize how our present
is qualified by the given-ness of the past and the potentialities
of the future, that we really know ourselves as historical. This
philosophical understanding of the living relation between his
tory and ourselves is echoed by Buber:
If history is a dialogue between God and man, we can under
stand its meaning oniy when we are the ones who are addressed
and only to the degree that we render ourselves receptive. This
is history’s claim on me and so this is its meaning as far as
I am concerned.2
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The moment of revelation for Buber is not Sinai or the
Cross, not a fixed dated point, but the moment when the indi
vidual perceives these as revelation; such perception is possible
at any time.
Such an understaiicling differs from the objective knowledge
of science in involving more than the rational faculty, in not
being something that can be proven or simply passed on, in
being like the relation between two persons rather than like
the relation to a fact or thing. Newman called this kind of know
ing the “illative sense”; Buber speaks of the “I-i hou attitude.”
Luther called it faith and said that faith was the correlate of
revelation, that revelation is revelation only to the believer.
Reinhold Niebuhr says that the truth about God and man can
not be known as fact but only in faith and repentance. Fox was
speaking of the same relationship when he said that the Scrip
tures could be understood only by being in the same life and
power as those were who brought them forth. That the historical
relation is a personal relation means that in revelation God
does not give us information about himself but that he himself
comes to meet us.
The quest for the historical Jesus ended in failure not be
cause it could not be proven that the man Jesus had lived but
because there was no “objective” history about him available;
the only relevant history was interpretation, keygma. The idea
that history is interpretation, that the conception of a purely
objective history is a mixing of categories, is central to the
existential understanding of history. The past is never closed,
never finished; it is history only so long as it is a repeatable
possibility which originated in the past. This implies that the
future is the most important dimension since our interpretation
of history will depend on our orientation toward the future.
Yet to agree with 1-leidegger that the past is made by the future
would be to ignore the Christian recognition that man (in
Reinhold Niebuhr’s phrase) is creature as well as creator of
history; it would be to try again to escape from the paradox.
Although the meaning of history for us depends on our percep
tion and our standpoint, the objective factor cannot be dissolved.
As Luther said, the Jews at least regarded Christ as a thief, we
look upoim him as only a fable. Yet it seems right to say with
l3ultiuann that Christ addresses us now as a question about our
future, and e say with Buber that God is always the God about
to come, that he comes only as the living God.
We cannot minimize the tension between the relativity of
our perspective and the absoluteness of our commitment which
characterizes the historical understanding of faith, since this
would be to minimize the difference between man and God. We
can know God only as he has shown himself to us and yet we
know him to be a trustworthy God. “His Word,” says Luther,
‘cannot be different from his nature.”3 Nevertheless our inter
pretive action should itself be understood in historical and not
in purely personal, subjective terms. If revelation meets us in
history, it meets us as we are in a world with others, in commun
ity. That the perspective of faith is the shared perspective of
the community of faith was seen clearly by early Friends. We
today know what it is to long for and seek after such a corn
niunity and to despair sometimes of finding it in this centrifugal
assemblage that Quakerism has become. We need to remember
that it is part of the Christian scandalon that God speaks to man
through man, that God can, if he will, speak through such im
perfect instruments as Quakerism, such unprepared men as our
selves. We cannot decide that we are to be the chosen people
nor that we are inadequate, but we can know ourselves respon
sible to him in this community where he has placed us willing
to leave the decision as to what is failure and what success in
his hands.
REVELJTION IN HISTORY
An historical conception of revelation cannot mean that
God discloses himself equally clearly in all moments—there are
mute times, times of eclipse as Buber feels ours to be, when
(though we may still have faith that a word is being spoken to
us) we have difficulty in hearing it, in discerning its meaning.
Paul Tillich’s conception of “theonomnous” periods in history,
of kairoi, times when eternity comes into time, may not have
taken into sufficient account man’s always ambiguous response,
but even Reinhold Niebuhr admits that there are proximate
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times, times when God and man draw closer. Revelation as his
torical cannot be revelation in general; it must always be par
ticular and concrete, just as faith is not faith in general but faith
at this time in this situation. Yet even Buber has come to see
that a situational, individual ethic is not adequate to a realistic
view of man as being still in history. He understands why Moses
cannot accept Korah’s plea that, since the people arc holy, com
mands from without are no longer necessary; he perceives that
“without law, without any clearcut and transmissible line of
demarcation between that which is pleasing and displeasing to
God, there can be no historical continuity of divine rule upon
earth.”
To find meaning in history seems to mean finding an in
terpretive center, a point at which it is more clear than elsewhere
what history is, what the meaning of man’s existence is, what
his relation to God is. For Christians it is Jesus Christ who meets
us as such a midpoint of history. He comes to us as a new and
necessary word, a word which clarifies God’s relation to us as
no other word does, but which we could never have deduced,
would never have expected to come this way. An historical un
derstanding of man and God is one which speaks of both in
terms of act, not being; in terms of encounter and response. Thus
a consistently historical conception of Christ is not one that
speaks of a metaphysical unity of divine and human essences but
of an identity of will between God and Christ, of our Conviction
that in hearing this man it is God’s voice we hear. It means that
the relation between God and man in Christ is not a static fact
or image but itself an action, an event. The relation between
God and man is that of dialogue. Christ has been called a dia
logic event; in him God’s word and man’s response are one
word. God is present in all his creation but in this event he
shows us most clearly that which is most important for us to
know—that he cares for us, comes to meet us, wills to be a father
to us. That God reveals himself in history in itself tells us what
he is like in regard to us; it shows that he is God, who, although
he comes in a way that we could not have anticipated, does in
deed will to come to meet us, and suffers for us, and forgives us.
And as Luther emphasizes, he comes to us in a way that lets us
remain men. To wish for a vision of God outside history, with
no reference to an historical past and an historical future, is to
wish to be something other than a real man; it is to wish to be
gods ourselves. “That there may be room for faith, all that is
believed must be hidden, yet it is not hidden more deeply than
under a contrary appearance.”5That the death on the Cross is
the triumphant center of history is true only for the believer;
for him holy history is not hidden history. There is no attempt
to hide the circularity; what is called for is more like a resolution
than like a conclusion. This interpretive act implies a decision
about ourselves as well as about Jesus Christ; revelation is not
understood until we know that it includes us, that it is not only
addressed to us but is about us, about our relation to God. That
God came to man in Jesus Christ means that he is a God who
comes to man, who comes to us. That God is such a God is never-
a fact of the past, never something we already know; it is always
still a question of faith.
Nor is everything clear even when we believe, believe
through our returning doubt that it could be so. For even the
most historically-minded of us it is difficult to believe that his
tory is really so important, that the singular event is truly
unique, that God actually meets us fully as a person. And an
essential mystery remains—a mystery which is perhaps deepest
at the very point where God reveals himself most Clearly—that
God should be a God who reveals himself—to us—in history.
To understand, says Buber, is not to be able to explain but to
be ready for personal encounter.
There is still the question ol the meaning of history in
another sense, the sense of its end rather than its center. The
question is whether the tension is that of a Here and a Beyond,
or of an Already and a Not-Yet. In a way it must be both, so
long as we remember with Jaspers that “there is no way around
history, but only a way through history.”6
If God really meets us in history, then he does not “fix it
from the yonder side,” for the relation between God and man
is more like two parts of a conversation than like cause and ef
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fect. This means that history is not predetermined, that it is
genuinely open, that God has left something for man to do, that
we are responsible. It is a paradoxical fact that for us who do
not believe in predestination it becomes most difficult to act,
at least after we have come to see the ambiguity in ourselves and
all the situations which confront us. There is no doubt that the
way of history is the way of risk. Here our Quaker understand
ing of man as one who can respond to God’s call has relevance:
our faith can give us courage to live and act in history.
Spiritual Religion and Historical Religion
WILMER A. COOPER
A fundamental fact about the life of man is that he is para
doxically a citizen of two worlds—the world of spirit, which
is the realm of freedom and universality, and the world of
physical reality, which is the realm of necessity, structure, and
particularity. History combines these two worlds in a time
sequence which is irreversible and non-repeatable. From the
vantage-point of the Hebrew-Christian faith, the space-time
world of history is not an illusion but has objective and concrete
reality. Unlike Eastern religions, Christianity and its predeces
sor, Judaism, place great emphasis upon the events of history
as media for God’s revelation of his will and purpose to man.
Both Christianity and Judaism affirm rather than deny the
value of life in this world. For this reason, the emphasis upon
life in the here-and-now carries with it ethical concern and social
responsibility, both of which are largely lacking in Eastern
thought. At the same time, the events of history are believed to
be of primary significance in relating the inward subjective realm
of spirit to the outward objective world of physical reality. It
is with this relationship between inner and outer, between
spirit and objective world, that this paper deals.
BASIC ASSUMPTIONS AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
It is an underlying assumption of this paper that Quaker
ism is rooted in and inextricably bound up with Christian his
tory. A century ago it would not have been necessary to assert
this, but we are required to do so in the light of the growing
tendency among some Friends to disclaim their Christian her
itage and realign their religious loyalties.
REFERENCES
1. George Fox, An Autobiography. Ferris and Leach, 1919, p. 82.
2. Martin Btiber, Israel and the World. Schocken Books, 1948. p. 81.
. Martin Luther, Sermons on the Gospel of St. John, Chapters 6-S.
Concordia Publishing House, 1960, p. 98.
4. Martin Buber, Moses. Harper and Brothers, 1958, p. 188.
5. Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will. Fleming H. Revell Co.,
1957, p. 101.
6. Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History. Yale University Press,
1953, p. 275.
14 15
7
Downing: Quakerism and the Historical Interpretation of Religion
Published by Digital Commons @ George Fox University, 1961
